

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: ISI SUBGROUP MEETING, 8 MARCH

CTB MESSAGE NO. 165

1. SUMMARY: SOFRONOV (USSR) FIRST REPEATED MOROKHOV'S STATEMENT THAT US INTERNAL STATION PROPOSALS WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND THEN SET OUT GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR EXCHANGE OF AUTHENTICATED SEISMIC DATA VIA AGREED COMMUNICATION CHANNELS UNDER A SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT AS A SUPPLEMENT TO NTM AND INTERNATIONAL DATA EXCHANGE. DATA WOULD BE FROM STATIONS DESIGNATED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK. INSTRUMENTATION AT STATIONS WOULD BE OF AGREED DESIGN, WITH DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT IN JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. SOFRONOV EMPHASIZED THAT STATION SHOULD BE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE IMPROVED IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMIC EVENTS ALREADY DETECTED BY NTM.

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TURNBULL (US) ASKED PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS AND PROVIDED REPLIES TO SOVIET QUESTIONS ASKED ON 2 MARCH. END SUMMARY.

2. SOFRONOV READ STATEMENT SETTING OUT GENERAL PROPOSALS FOR EXCHANGING SEISMIC DATA FROM IMPROVED NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (US DEL TRANSLATION OF STATEMENT SENT SEPTEL). REPEATING THAT SOV DEL HAD FOUND US ISI PRO-

POSALS UNACCEPTABLE, SOFRONOV SAID THEY WERE NEVERTHELESS PREPARED TO AGREE TO SOME SUPPLEMENTAL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. SUCH PROCEDURES SHOULD BE BASED ON EXISTING TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES. THEY SHOULD PROVIDE FOR IMPROVED IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMIC EVENTS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN DETECTED BY NTM, AND TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT CERTAIN STATIONS HAD ALREADY BEEN DESIGNATED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC DATA EXCHANGE (ISDE).

3. SOFRONOV SAID THE SOVIET DEL WAS PROPOSING AN EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA, BASED ON THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WHICH MET THE MAIN US OBJECTIVES IN PROPOSING ISI. THEIR PROPOSALS WERE AS FOLLOWS:

(A) DATA SHOULD BE OBTAINED FROM STATIONS DESIGNATED FOR THE GLOBAL SEISMIC NETWORK. THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT PARTICIPANTS IN ISDE WOULD NOT MISUNDERSTAND THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT, AS THEY MIGHT IF THE STATIONS FOR THE TWO PURPOSES WERE DIFFERENT. AT THE SAME TIME, IN DESIGNATING STATIONS, WE WERE BOTH GUIDED BY INTEREST IN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION AND TOOK INTO ACCOUNT NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.

(B) INSTRUMENTATION AT THE STATIONS SHOULD MEET AGREED TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS TO BE DEVELOPED IN A CONSULTATIVE BODY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BOTH THE SCIENTIFIC REQUIRE-
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MENTS AND THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING TECHNOLOGY SO AS NOT TO UNDULY DELAY THE EXCHANGE.

(C) MEASURES TO AUTHENTICATE THE DATA FROM NATIONAL STATIONS SHOULD BE AGREED. WHILE THE SOVIET DEL DID NOT BELIEVE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF FALSIFYING SEISMIC DATA, THEY WERE WILLING, IN ORDER TO MEET OTHERS HALFWAY, TO STUDY THIS FURTHER. SOVIET DEL MIGHT COME UP WITH OWN PROPOSAL, UTILIZE EQUIPMENT DEVELOPED BY US, OR PERHAPS REACH COMPROMISE DESIGN. INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES FOR THE DEVICE WOULD ALSO BE AGREED.

(D) PARTICIPANTS IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT WOULD USE AGREED COMMUNICATION CHANNELS TO TRANSMIT DATA. THIS FORMULATION WOULD ALLOW EACH SIDE TO DETERMINE THE MOST APPROPRIATE CHANNELS IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREED REQUIREMENTS.

(E) AGREEMENT SHOULD SPECIFY THAT AGREED EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES WOULD BE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PURPOSES OF VERIFICATION, AND THAT EQUIPMENT BE OPERATED SOLELY BY NATIONAL PERSONNEL.

(F) SPECIFIC MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD BE ENTRUSTED TO THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (JCC).

4. TURNBULL (US) THANKED SOFRONOV FOR PROPOSALS. HE ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS TO HELP CLARIFY PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY ON AUTHENTICATION, COMMUNICATION, AND STATION CHARACTERISTICS. SPECIFICALLY, HE ASKED, HOW COULD PROPOSAL THAT STATION CHARACTERISTICS BE AGREED IN JCC BE RECONCILED WITH EXCHANGE OF DATA IMMEDIATELY AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE?

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5. SOFRONOV REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE SHOULD BEGIN WITH WHATEVER EQUIPMENT WAS AVAILABLE AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON STATION CHARACTERISTICS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE COUNTRY IN WHOSE TERRITORY AN AMBIGUOUS SEISMIC EVENT OCCURRED WOULD BE THE FIRST TO WANT TO PROVE ITS INNOCENCE; THEREFORE THERE WOULD BE NO RELUCTANCE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CHARACTERISTICS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

6. FAKLEY (UK) NOTED THAT IF DECISION ON TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS WAS DEFERRED, THIS WOULD MAKE IT DIFFI-

CULT TO ADVISE POLITICAL LEADERS ON WHAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF VERIFICATION WOULD BE. IN REPLY, SOFRONOV EMPHASIZED THAT SINCE STATIONS UNDER THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT WERE TO BE SUPPLEMENTAL TO NTM AND ISDE, THEY WOULD ONLY BE CONTRIBUTING TO MORE EFFECTIVE IDENTIFICATION OF SEISMIC

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EVENTS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN DETECTED BY NTM AND ISDE. IF THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD, HE DIDN'T THINK THAT AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL DETAILS IN THE JCC WOULD BE DIFFICULT.

7. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION BY TURNBULL, SOFRONOV SAID THAT THE IDENTITY AND LOCATION OF ADDITIONAL STATIONS FOR THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT BEYOND THOSE ALREADY EARMARKED FOR ISDE COULD BE DETERMINED DURING THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS. TURNBULL ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIET DEL WOULD PRESENT A LIST OF PROPOSED STATION CHARACTERISTICS TO BE AGREED, AND SOFRONOV SAID THIS SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AFTER AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON THE PRINCIPLES HE HAD OUTLINED. PHELPS (US) EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF DECIDING DETAILS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF STATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, RATHER THAN DEFERRING THEM FOR LATER AGREEMENT IN JCC.

8. TURNBULL ENDED THE MEETING BY PASSING TO SOVIETS WRITTEN ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SOFRONOV ON 2 MARCH. ANSWERS FOLLOWED LINES OF PREVIOUS WRITTEN AND ORAL ANSWERS TO SOVIET DEL QUESTIONS.

9. IN VIEW OF HIS COMMENTS ON STATIONS BEING SUPPLEMENTAL TO NTM, SOFRONOV WAS ASKED AFTER MEETING WHETHER HE MEANT THAT SOVIETS WOULD TRANSMIT ALL DATA FROM STATIONS. SOFRONOV REPLIED THAT A SHORT ANSWER WOULD NOT PLEASE US, BUT THAT HE WOULD TRY TO GIVE A LONG ANSWER THAT WOULD PLEASE US AT NEXT MEETING. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION, SOVIET DELOFF MALEV, WHEN PRESSED ON DETAILS OF SOVIET DEL OBJECTIONS TO SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS, SAID OBJECTIONS WERE ONLY TO CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. HE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE WHEN ASKED WHETHER SOVIETS CONTEMPLATED DUPLICATE SATELLITE SYSTEMS OR LAND LINES. HE SAID WE

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WOULD PROBABLY END UP WITH A BIT OF THIS AND A BIT OF THAT, BUT IN ANY EVENT EXTENSIVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. WARNKE

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